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Abstract
We revisit the standard theoretical model of tax competition to consider imperfect mobility
of both capital and labor. We show that the mobility of one factor aﬀects the taxation
of both factors, and that the race-to-the-bottom narrative (with burden shifting) applies
essentially to capital exporting countries. We test our predictions for a panel of 28 OECD
countries over 1997-2014. We ﬁnd capital taxation to be less sensitive to capital mobility in
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support this conclusion. Qantitatively, though, rising capital mobility contributes much
less than population ageing to the decline of capital tax rates over the period studied.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on tax competition generally ﬁnds that, when capital is mobile
whereas land (or labor, or consumption) is not, it is optimal for a benevolent government
not to tax capital, hence to ﬁnance the provision of public goods only through taxing
immobile bases (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1999).1 As a matter of facts,
corporate tax rates have generally decreased in advanced economies since the 1980s (see
Figure 1), while wealth taxes were hollowing out in most countries.
Figure 1: Eﬀective Average Tax Rate on corporate income, 28 OECD countries*
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Source: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
Strikingly, though, the empirical literature has remained quite inconclusive on the
impact of international capital mobility on the taxation of capital (see the meta analysis of
Adam et al., 2013). This surprising non-result may be explained in diﬀerent ways. First,
higher inequalities resulting partly from globalization may have raised the demand for
insurance against shocks (compensation eﬀect of globalization, see Rodrik, 1998). Second,
1Within a general equilibrium model, though, Mendoza and Tesar, 2005 show that capital mobility
may not trigger a "race to the bottom" in capital taxation because taxing labor entails ineﬃciency costs.
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ﬁnancial integration has come together with some forms of social and political integration,
which may have had opposite eﬀects on capital taxation (Dreher, 2006). Third, ﬁnancial
globalization has been concommittant to population ageing: even in autarky, an ageing
median voter may have voted in favor of declining taxes on capital.2 Finally, ﬁnancial
globalization, like trade openning up, is a common feature of advanced economies over the
1990s and 2000s. As evidenced e.g. by Slemrod (2004), this makes it it diﬃcult to identify
its impact once time ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced.
In this paper, we address the above-mentioned pitfalls and further explore two ad-
ditional explanations for the apparent limited eﬀect of ﬁnancial globalization on capital
taxation. The ﬁrst one is the simultaneous increase in the mobility of labor. Although
in general labor mobility has remained limited over the last three decades, the mobility
of at least skilled labor has increased, especially within the European Union where legal
barriers to labor mobility have been eliminated. Figure 2 compares a measure of de facto
labor and capital mobility for OECD countries. From 1997 to 2014, labor mobility among
OECD countries increased by 42% on average. This increase may appear modest com-
pared to the rise in de facto capital mobility (+223% over the same period).3 However,
this increase is substantial per se, especially when considering that its concentration on a
minority of skilled workers.
The literature on tax competition generally enphasizes the burden shifting impact of
capital mobility, or equivalently the "compensation eﬀect" of globalization, which both
end up in reduced capital taxation and increased labor taxation following ﬁnancial glob-
alization (see, e.g. Adam and Kammas, 2007). However, labor mobility may alter this
result in two ways. First, labor mobility may put downward pressure on labor taxation,
at least at relatively high levels of compensation. Liebig et al. (2007), Kleven et al. (2013)
and Kleven et al. (2014) ﬁnd very high elasticities for top-income foreign workers to tax
diﬀerentials. Since foreign workers are a relatively small proportion of the high-income
population, Piketty and Saez (2012) and Lehmann et al. (2014) retain an elasticity of
2Adam and Kammas (2007) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, negative impact of the share of the population over 65
years on corporate income tax rates. In general, though, the empirical literature does not control for
population ageing.
3Due to the high volatility of capital ﬂows, we compare a ﬂow measure of labor mobility to a stock
measure of capital mobility. Averaging labor and capital mobility over 6-year windows, we ﬁnd that gross
capital ﬂows increased in 2009-2014 by 158% compared to 1997-2002. During the same period, labor
mobility increased by 38%.
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0.25 for top-income earners. Lehmann et al. (2014) show that, if the semi-elasticity of
migration increases for higher incomes, then it is optimal to reduce the marginal tax rates
on top-income earners. Second, to the extent that the skilled workers are in the position
to take decisions concerning the location of capital (both at the ﬁrm level and as savers),
labor and capital mobility are likely to be intertwined. More mechanically, labor and capi-
tal mobility interact since the marginal productivity of one factor depends on the quantity
of the other factor (see Wilson, 1995).4
The second feature we would like to study is the fact that even capital is not per-
fectly mobile internationally. In particular, a large literature has evidenced a home bias
in international portfolio choices.5 At the macroeconomic level, imperfect capital mobility
translates into a wedge between after-tax returns across countries, depending on whether
each country is a net capital exporter or importer.6 More capital mobility reduces this
wedge, with ambiguous impact on tax rates. However, the literature on tax competi-
tion generally considers capital to be perfectly mobile, which leads to an equalization of
after-tax returns. An exception is Lee (1997) who introduces transaction costs within a
two-jurisdictions model. In his setting, tax competition may lead to higher capital tax
rates because each jurisdiction disregards the fact that raising its own tax depresses the
after-tax return in both jurisdictions. Yet, the transaction cost is given, whereas in the
macroeconomic literature, an indebted country will need to oﬀer higher after-tax rerurn
than the rest of the world if it wants to keep its foreign capital.
We consider a model of tax competition à la Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) where
the benevolent government of a small open economy maximises the average household's
utility that depends of the consumption of both a private good and of a public good. The
latter good is ﬁnanced through two taxes at the source: one on capital and the other one
on labor. Both capital and labor are imperfectly mobile internationally. However, there
is an asymmetry between capital and labor: while workers must be residents of the same
4In Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Razin and Sadka (1991), labor supply is endogenous, which
attenuates the standard result of taxation falling on the immobile base. However, to the extent that
the elasticity of labor supply is ﬁnite, the mobile base stays under-taxed compared to the immobile one.
These authors do not consider labor mobility across jurisdictions. Bucovetsky (2003) and Razin and Sadka
(2012) do consider labor mobility, but they assume an heterogeneity between local and immigrant workers
in terms of productivity or capital endowment.
5See the seminal paper by French and Poterba (1991), or the literature review by Lewis (1999).
6Horioka and Ford (2017) also explain why return diﬀerentials are not eliminated by ﬁnancial integra-
tion.
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Figure 2: De facto capital and labor mobility: OECD countries, 1997-2014
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Note: Capital mobility is the sum of total assets and liabilities in percent of GDP (source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2004, updated). Labor mobility is the sum of inﬂows and outﬂows of non-nationals from
other OECD countries, divided by the total population of the country (source: OECD database). The
graph shows unweighted OECD averages.
country where they work, capital owners may be residents or non-residents.7
We ﬁrst show that capital and labor taxation generally coexist. We then study the
impact of factor mobility on both tax rates, through a full derivation of a simpliﬁed model
and through simulations of the general model. We ﬁnd that the government will reduce
the tax rate on capital as a result of increased capital mobility (race to the bottom) and
increase the tax rate on labor (burden shifting), but mostly for a country that is a net
capital exporter. For a net capital importer, the results are more mixed. In contrast, being
a net exporter or importer of labor has ambigous eﬀect on the impact of labor mobility
because the international position of a country on the labor market needs to be considered
in combination with its position on the capital market.
The intuition of our result is the following. In a world of imperfect capital mobility,
a capital-importing country needs to oﬀer a higher ater-tax return than the rest of the
7This assumption, sometimes labeled "regional model" is standard in the literature, especially for
international tax competition (see Wilson, 1999). However the literature on local tax competition has
sometimes studied "metropolitan" models where individuals commute between home and work, see Braid
(1996). In Richter and Wellisch (1996), households work in their country of residence while holding capital
in other jurisdictions. However their capital (land) is in ﬁxed supply in each jurisdiction.
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world, hence a lower tax rate, in order to attract capital. Conversely, a country with
high capital endowment may enjoy a higher tax rate than the rest of the world.8 Along
ﬁnancial globalization, these after-tax returns diminish: the net capital importing country
may raise its tax rate whereas the net capital exporter has to reduce its own tax rate.
Considering the net position of each country in terms of foreign direct investment in 1996
(with a positive sign for a net capital exporter), Figure 3 shows a positive relationship
with the Eﬀective Average Tax Rate (hence the eﬀective corporate income tax rate) in
2003 but this relationship vanishes in 2014.9
Figure 3: Net FDI position in 1996 and EATR in 2003 (blue circles) and 2014 (red squares)
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Sources: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti.
We test our theoretical predictions on a panel of 28 OECD countries over the period
1997-2014, by successively studying the impact of factor mobility on the eﬀective average
tax rate on corporate capital and on the tax wedge on relatively high wages (gross income
representing 167% of average earnings). We pay careful attention to several other variables
that may also have aﬀected tax rates over this period, namely trade openness, ageing,
government spending and debt, and political leadership. We also include country and
8Peralta and van Ypersele (2005) also highlight the importance of capital endowments in a two-country
framework where labor is not mobile.
9We use 2003 because it is the ﬁrst year when we have the tax rates for our 28 OECD countries.
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time ﬁxed eﬀects, and we interact factor mobility with proxies of factor importing or
exporting status.
We ﬁnd evidence that capital mobility has a negative impact on capital taxation and
a positive impact on labor taxation, but essentially for capital exporting countries. Con-
versely, labor mobility has ambiguous impact on both tax rates. Quantitatively, though,
we ﬁnd a much larger contribution of population ageing than of increased capital mobility
to the decline of corporate income tax rates over the period studied.
We ﬁnally carry out three robustness tests. The ﬁrst addresses the potential endo-
geneity of factor mobility. The second one shows that the convergence speed of capital
tax rates depends on the net capital position of a country, which is another way of looking
at the same phenomenon. Finally, we provide two placebo exercises for the value-added
tax and for the taxation of wages at the minimum income.
We conclude that the mixed results obtained in the literature concerning the link
between international capital mobility and capital taxation may be related to improperly
controlling for other factors, notably trade openness and ageing, failing to account for
labor mobility, and to the extreme assumption of full capital mobility versus full labor
immobility.
Our results suggests that a country that opens up to capital inﬂows may be less
vulnerable in its ability to tax capital than a country that opens up to capital outﬂows.
But also that these eﬀects are second order compared to population ageing or (in the case
of labor taxation), to the increase in government spending and debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the
theoretical setting and solves a simpliﬁed version. Section 3 presents the calibration and
simulation of the complete model. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and the
data used. The econometric results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
We consider a small open economy where production is achieved using two internationally
mobile factors - capital and labor. A public good is ﬁnanced through source taxation
of capital and of labor. The government maximizes a utility function that depends on
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public spending and on the after-tax national income per inhabitant. The novelty of the
model is to highlight the cross eﬀects of the mobility of one factor on the taxation of the
other factor. Furthermore, our setting allows us to contrast the impact of factor mobility
depending on whether the economy is a net exporter or importer of capital.
2.1 Production and incomes
Production is achieved using two internationally mobile factors, capital and labor, denoted
K and L respectively. The production function is written as F (K,hL), where F (., .)
satisﬁes constant returns-to-scale and is increasing and concave in each arguments and
where h > 0 is an exogenous scaling parameter. We assume that capital and labor
are taxed at the source at rates τK and τL, respectively. We denote by r
∗ and w∗ the
international remuneration of capital and labor, respectively, and by r and w the domestic
after-tax return of each factor such that r := F ′K (., .)− τK and w := F ′L (., .)− τL.
We assume that two types of agents are living in the considered economy: (mobile)
workers, assumed to be equal to the labor force L, and (immobile) pensioners of mass
D.10 Both have the same capital endowment, denoted k¯,11 and thus the total capital
available in the economy depends on the total number of residents: K = (L+D)k¯. Both
workers (who are supposed to live in the same country where they work) an pensioners
can invest their capital endowment in a diﬀerent country. Capital income is the sum
of the domestic capital income rK and of the revenue of the net investment position
(L+D)k¯−K. Importantly, a positive net investment position yields the foreign after-tax
return r∗, whereas a negative net investment position costs the domestic after-tax return
r, as part of the domestic capital income is channeled towards foreign investors. The rest
of the earnings is made of an (after-tax) wage w, for workers and of an exogenous pension,
denoted p, for pensioners. Hence, the private incomes (or disposable incomes) of each
10The importance of featuring pensioners in the model will appear clear in the econometric section of
the paper.
11We do not study speciﬁc results that could arise from heterogenous capital between natives and
migrants (Razin and Sadka, 2012) nor from diﬀerent productivities (Bucovetsky, 2003).
8
worker and pensioner, denoted yL and yD, respectively, are given by:
yL =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
rk + r∗
(
k¯ − k)+ w if k¯ ≥ k,
rk + r
(
k¯ − k)+ w if k¯ ≤ k, (1)
and:
yD =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
rk + r∗
(
k¯ − k)+ p if k¯ ≥ k,
rk + r
(
k¯ − k)+ p if k¯ ≤ k, (2)
where k := K/ (L+D) is the capital per resident.12 Notice that, in our model, workers
relocate with their capital endowment, or stay home and invest their endowment overseas.
Hence there is an asymmetry between capital and labor: attracting a new worker will
automatically attract a new capital endowment, whereas attracting new capital will attract
new workers only through the induced rise in the marginal productivity of labor.13 We now
turn to the conditions that provide the wedge between the domestic and the international
remunerations of both factors.
2.2 No-arbitrage conditions with imperfect factor mobility
In contrast to the existing literature on tax competition, we assume that both capital
and labor are imperfectly mobile, and that the extent of mobility may diﬀer for capital
and labor. In macroeconomic models, frictions in the international capital market are
typically modelled as departures from the uncovered interest parity depending on the
net foreign asset position of the country (see e.g. Lindé and Pescatori, 2017, Itskhoki
and Mukhin, 2019). Consistently, we assume that the stock of productive capital in
the domestic economy depends on the domestic endowment and on the gap between the
domestic after-tax return on capital and the international remuneration of capital, which
inﬂuences the international allocation of capital endowments:14
K =
[
k¯ + φK (r − r∗)
]
(L+D), (3)
12If k¯ = k, then the alternative expressions of yL and yD are equivalent since r = r
∗, see next sub-section.
13Such asymmetry could be erased if workers were allowed to work and live in two diﬀerent countries.
Existing models of international tax competition generally disregard this possibility, but things could
change with the expansion of cross-border telecommuting (see Baldwin, 2016).
14For simplicity, we consider the depreciation rate of capital to be equal to its price variation over one
period, so that the user cost of capital is equal to its gross marginal return.
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where φK ≥ 0 represents the degree of capital mobility. Hence, a country can enjoy
productive capital in excess of its domestic endowment (i.e. K > (L+D)k¯) if its after-tax
return is greater than the international return.15 In the limit case such that φK = 0,
capital is immobile and we have K = (L+D)k¯. Conversely, when φK →∞, an inﬁnitely
small excess return is required to attract foreign capital, so at equilibrium the domestic
after-tax return is equal to the international return: r = r∗. For intermediate values of
φK , the domestic after-tax return satisﬁes:
r = r∗ +
k − k¯
φK
. (4)
The literature on international migrations has also modelled the remuneration wedge
between host and origin countries as a function of market frictions, here migration costs
(see Borjas, 1989). By analogy with capital, we assume that the quantity of labor in the
domestic economy depends on an exogenous labor endowment, denoted L¯, and on the gap
between the after-tax labor return and the international remuneration of labor:
L = L¯+ φL (w − w∗)L, (5)
where φL ≥ 0 represents the international mobility of labor. Like for capital mobility, this
parameter is scaled by the size of the economy, here L. For φL = 0, we have L = L¯, while
φL → ∞ corresponds to perfect labor mobility that implies w = w∗. For intermediate
values of φL, there is a wedge between the domestic after-tax wage and its international
remuneration:
w = w∗ +
1− L¯L
φL
. (6)
For given K and L, the absolute size of the wedge in conditions (4) and (6) declines
for higher factor mobility. For instance, higher capital mobility makes it easier for a net
capital importer to attract foreign capital: the premium needed to attract foreign investors
is reduced, and the capacity to tax is increased. By replacing r by F ′K (., .)− τK in (4) we
indeed obtain that:
∂τK
∂φK
∣∣∣∣
K,L given
=
k − k¯
φ2K
. (7)
15Symmetrically, K < (L+D)k¯ is consistent with r < r∗.
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For a given level of capital and labor, partial derivative (7) suggests that the tax rate on
capital should increase with capital mobility for a net capital importer, and decrease for a
net capital exporter. The same reasoning applies to labor, except that it is the diﬀerence
between L and L¯ that is relevant. However, capital and labor will adjust to a change in
factor mobility, so the model needs to be solved before it is possible to conclude.
By replacing the no-arbitrage conditions (4) and (6) in the equations that deﬁne private
incomes, i.e. (1) and (2), we obtain:
yL =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w∗ +
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
+ r∗k¯ +
(
k−k¯
φK
)
k if k¯ ≥ k,
w∗ +
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
+ r∗k¯ +
(
k−k¯
φK
)
k¯ if k¯ ≤ k.
(8)
and:
yD =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p+ r∗k¯ +
(
k−k¯
φK
)
k if k¯ ≥ k,
p+ r∗k¯ +
(
k−k¯
φK
)
k¯ if k¯ ≤ k.
(9)
For a given L, we see that the income is always larger in a capital importing country than
in a capital exporting one. The reason is that the after-tax return on capital is higher
and overcompensates for the loss induced by the outﬂow beneﬁting to foreign investors.
Incomes per capita are independent from L when labor mobility is inﬁnite and from k
when capital mobility is inﬁnite.
2.3 Tax rates
The government maximizes a social welfare function that depends on private incomes
and on average public spending net of transfers, denoted G, divided by the size of the
population L + D.16 Private incomes, yL and yD, are weighted using the demographic
weight of each type of agents, L/ (L+D) for workers and D/ (L+D) for pensioners, and
a parameter γ > 0 that reﬂects the relative weight of each pensioner to a worker, which
can be justiﬁed e.g. by diﬀerent participation rates to the elections. The social welfare
16Hence, public spending is not subjet to returns to scale. It refers to e.g. education or healthcare
rather than to e.g. military spending. By doing so, we do not want to introduce an incentive for the
government to increase the size of the economy.
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function of the government is given by:
U
(
L
L+D
yL + γ
D
L+D
yD,
G
L+D
)
(10)
where U is an increasing and concave function in both arguments. Both partial derivatives,
denoted UY (., .) and UG (., .), are assumed to be inﬁnite when the argument equals zero.
Finally, we assume that the budget is balanced and, consequently, that the public spending
net of transfers is equal to total tax revenues:
G = τKK + τLL− pD. (11)
The government's problem then is to set τK and τL so as to maximize its utility
function (10) subject to conditions (4), (6), (1), (2), and (11). The resolution of the model
is presented in Appendix A. In particular, we can show that the optimal tax rate on capital
satisﬁes:
τK =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
φk
[
(1− η) k + η (k¯ − k)] if k¯ ≥ k,
1
φk
[(
k − k¯)+ (1− η) k¯] if k¯ ≤ k. where: η := U
′
Y (., .)
U ′G (., .)
L+ γD
L+D
. (12)
In the case of an equal weight to each inhabitant in the utility function (i.e. for γ = 1),
it can be shown (see Appendix A) that there is an underprovision of public goods, i.e. that
partial derivative of the social welfare function satisfy U ′Y (., .) < U
′
G (., .), which implies
that η < 1. Using the expressions (12), we thus immediately conclude that the tax on
capital is positive. It tends to zero for inﬁnite capital mobility. For imperfect capital
mobility, the tax rate depends on an endogenous parameter. We ﬁrst solve the model in
the particular case where D = 0 before moving to simulations for D > 0.
For D = 0, it can be shown (see Appendix A) that marginal utilities of public and
private goods are equal, i.e. U ′Y (., .) = U
′
G (., .), which permit to conclude that η = 1.
Using (12), the optimal tax on capital is thus:
τK |D=0 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(k¯−k)
φk
if k¯ ≥ k,
(k−k¯)
φk
if k¯ ≤ k,
(13)
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where k is obtained, using (4), as the solution of the following equations:
F ′K (k, h) = r
∗ if k¯ ≥ k,
F ′K (k, h) = r
∗ + 2(k−k¯)φK if k¯ ≤ k.
(14)
Equations (14) state that the level of capital per worker k is obtained by equalizing the
marginal productivity to the world's capital return r∗ if the country is a net exporter of
capital. Conversely, we see that the marginal productivity is larger than r∗ if the country
is a net importer of capital. This asymmetry is a direct consequence on the assumption
we made on the diﬀerential remunerations of the net investment position. Computing the
eﬀect of a change in the degree of mobility on the tax rate is then straightforward and
gives:
∂τK |D=0
∂φK
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(k¯−k)
φ2k
if k¯ ≥ k,
− 1
φ2K
(
k − k¯) [ F ′′KK(k,h)
F ′′KK(k,h)− 2φK
]
if k¯ ≤ k.
(15)
In both cases, an increase in the capital mobility reduces the tax rate on capital (it
triggers a race to the bottom), but the derivative (in absolute value) is larger for a
capital exporting country than for an importing one. This is due to the fact that in the
latter case, mobility increases the capital per worker, hence increases the tax base and
reduces the after-tax return premium. This key theoretical result is supported by the
empirical analysis we present in Section 5. Concerning the eﬀect of the capital mobility
on the tax rate on labor, we have (provided that the social welfare function is additively
separable, see the Appendix A):
∂τL|D=0
∂φK
=
k
(
k¯ − k)
φ2K
if k¯ ≥ k. (16)
For a capital exporting country, capital mobility increases the tax rate on labor. This
burden shifting eﬀect can be explained by the fact that the additional capital outﬂow
triggered by higher capital mobility will come along with an outﬂow of labor, since capital
per worker (determined by r∗, see Equation (14)) stays constant ex post. Hence the labor
tax base is reduced. For a capital importing country, higher capital mobility triggers an
inﬂow of capital that exceeds the inﬂow of labor (since capital per worker k increases, see
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Equation (14)). The net impact on labor taxation is ambiguous as it depends on how k
reacts to higher capital mobility. We conclude that the burden shifting eﬀect should be
less apparent in capital importing countries than in capital exporting ones.
3 Model simulations
Now we come back to the complete model with D > 0, that we calibrate in order to
simulate the impact of capital and labor mobility on tax rates. We ﬁrst need to choose
functional forms for the production and utility functions. We rely on a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function:
Y = F (K,hL) = Kα(hL)1−α, (17)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and h > 0. In turn, we assume a log-linear utility function:
U = ln
(
(1− δ)RL
L
+ γδ
RD
D
)
+ θln
(
G
L+D
)
, (18)
where θ > 0 represents the relative weight of the public good.
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model on the four largest economies of the euro area: Germany, France,
Italy and Spain, over 1997-2017. All four countries have fully liberalized capital ﬂows in
the early 1990s and their participation in the euro means that the frictions on capital
markets related to exchange-rate volatility are similar. Furthermore, they have liberalized
intra-EU labor ﬂows over the 2000s, although not the ﬂows with the rest of the world. For
each variable, we take the country average over 1997-2017 and then the average over the
four countries, weighted by GDP.
The old dependency ratio (d = D/L) is taken from the World Bank, Health Nutrition
and Population Statistics. It is set to 27%. Hence, the share of the pensioners in the
population is δ = DL+D = 0.21.
17
Gross disposable income of households (when aggregating workers and pensioners) is
17Since L is endogenous, we set d and δ in terms of the labor endowment L¯.
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calibrated at 65% of GDP, based on the Ameco database of the European Commission.
From the same database, we calculate that public pensions represent 13% of GDP whereas
public expenditure other than inter-personnal transfers represents 35% of GDP: pDY = 0.13,
G
Y = 0.35.
Exogenous foreign factor returns r∗ and w∗ are calibrated based on the returns observed
over the period for the four countries. According to Jordà et al. (2019), p. 1293, the post-
1980 real return on wealth averaged 6.29% in Germany, 4.72% in France, 5.01% in Italy
and 5.34% in Spain. We set r∗ = 0.05. From Ameco, we get a net worth per household of
around 160,000 euros. We divide by 10,000 and set k¯ = 16. We then recover w∗ based on
the 0.7 labor share we get from Ameco and using: r
∗k¯(1+d)
w∗ =
0.3
0.7 , which gives w
∗ = 2.4.
From Ameco, the ratio of public pensions to labor compensations is 0.27, i.e. pDwL =
0.27. Since D/L = 0.27, we get p = w: our simulation should yield a similar value for
unit pension and unit wage.
Implicit tax rates are recovered from the European Commission's Taxation Trends
database. Labor taxes represent 21% of GDP whereas the share of corporate tax revenues
is 2.7% of GDP. In our model, there are no other taxes. Since the budget constraint
imposes that τKK+τLLY =
G+pD
Y = 0.48, we target
τKK
Y = 0.055 and
τLL
Y = 0.425.
Finally, the size of the workforce can be set at any level since it will just determine
the size of the economy. We set L¯ = 100.
The ﬁrst line of Table 1 provides the values of the exogenous variables L¯, D = dL¯, r∗,
w∗. In the second line, we report the target ratios that are used to calibrate the parameters
of the model: α, h, γ, p, θ, φK , φL. The third line provides two parameters that can be
set without model simulations: α and γ. As already mentioned, the labor share is 0.7 in
our sample, hence we have α = 0.3. In our benchmark calibration, we also assume that
the weight of the pensioners in the utility function is no higher than their share in the
population of households: γ = 1. The next line reports the other parameters that are set
so as the model solution is close to our ﬁve target ratios.
The second part of Table 1 reports the results of the simulated model in two diﬀerent
cases: the benchmark case, which corresponds to high capital endowment (k¯ = 16), and
a variant with low capital endowment (k¯ = 13). The endogenous ratios are close to their
targets. The ratio of pensions to GDP is a bit small, but rising p would make the unit
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pension exceed the unit wage. As for labor taxation, it is slightly too small, but rising it
would make G/Y exceed its target.
Table 1: Calibration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exogenous variables L¯ = 100 D = 27 r∗ = 0.05 w∗ = 2.4
Targets ratios p
w
= 1 G
Y
= 0.35 pD
Y
= 0.13 τKK
Y
= 0.055 τLL
Y
= 0.425
Preset parameters α = 0.3 γ = 1
Calibrated parameters h = 2 p = 1.3 θ = 0.57 φK = 100 φL = 0.1
Benchmark: high capital endowment (k¯ = 16)
Endogenous ratios p
w
= 1.04 G
Y
= 0.3510 pD
Y
= 0.010 τKK
Y
= 0.061 τLL
Y
= 0.387
Production factors k = 15.7 L = 89.7
Variant: low capital endowment (k¯ = 13)
Endogenous ratios p
w
= 1.12 G
Y
= 0.3472 pD
Y
= 0.1029 τKK
Y
= 0.0524 τLL
Y
= 0.3976
Production factors k = 13.4 L = 89.0
In this benchmark, high endowment case, we get k < k¯, hence we are in the case of
a net capital exporting country. Conversely, the low endowment case yields k > k¯, hence
we are in the case of a net capital importer.
3.2 The impact of factor mobility on tax rates
We can now simulate the model with diﬀerent coeﬃcients of capital mobility, φK and labor
mobility, φL. In each case, we successively simulate the model with D = 27 and γ = 1
(their calibrated values) and with a higher weight of pensioners either demographically
(D) or politically (γ).
Capital mobility
In this ﬁrst group of simulations, we keep the exogenous variables and parameters of
Table 1 except for φK that is allowed to change by ±10%. We then study how population
ageing aﬀects the results through a variant where D = 30 instead of 27. We also study
how the results are aﬀected when pensioners have more say than the workers in public
decisions (we set γ = 1.05 instead of 1 in this case). The results are presented in Figure 4
16
in the case of a net capital exporter (k¯ = 16) and in Figure 5 for the case of a net capital
importer (k¯ = 13). In each case, we plot the evolution of the tax rates τK and τL as a
function of φK , the evolution of capital per person k and the workforce L, and ﬁnally the
share of capital taxation and of labor taxation in GDP.
The case with D = 27 and γ = 1 is depicted through black lines. Figure 4 (capital
exporter) illustrates the standard result where higher capital mobility triggers a reduction
in capital taxation and a shift of the tax burden on to labor. Consistently, the labor force
falls when the labor tax is raised, whereas the capital per resident increases. In the case
of a net capital importer (Figure 5), more capital mobility also triggers a reduction in
capital taxation and rise in labor taxation, but to a much lesser extent. When φK rises
from 90 to 100, capital taxation falls from 7.97% of GDP to 6.4% in the case of a capital
exporter but only from 5.47 to 5.26% in the case of a capital importer. Simultaneously,
the share of labor taxation rises from 37% to 38.4% in the former case, but only from 39.6
to 39.75% in the latter case.
Figure 4: Impact of capital mobility on taxation: net capital exporter (k¯ = 16)
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Notes: black lines are for D = 27, γ = 1; blue lines for higher dependence (D = 30, γ = 1), red lines for
higher political weight of pensioners (D = 27, γ = 1.05).
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Figure 5: Impact of capital mobility on taxation: net capital importer (k¯ = 13)
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Notes: black lines are for D = 27, γ = 1; blue lines for higher dependence (D = 30, γ = 1), red lines for
higher political weight of pensioners (D = 27, γ = 1.05).
Interestingly, the two types of countries diﬀer in their reaction to ageing (blue lines).
A capital importing country reacts to a higher dependence ratio by increasing the tax rate
on labor, whereas a capital exporting country reacts by lowering the taxation of labor
(and increasing the tax rate on capital). In both cases, the rising number of pensioners
requires additional tax revenues. It also reduces the share of workers in the utility function
of the government. In a capital importing country, though, the return on capital is higher
than in the rest of the world, so the capital outﬂow following an increase in the tax rate
on capital is relatively costly: it is better not to increase capital taxation. For a capital
exporter, the priority is rather to attract foreign workers through lower labor taxation.
The rise in capital taxation reduces domestic capital per resident, but the loss in terms
of income is limited by the fact that the after-tax remuneration of capital is already less
than in the rest of the world.
Hence, the impact of population ageing in our model is either a rise in capital taxation
(in a capital exporting country) or a very limited decrease (for a capital importer): in our
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model, the benevolent government of a net capital exporting country had better cut labor
taxation than capital taxation to ﬁnance additional pensions. The result is diﬀerent when
ageing comes along increased political weight of the pensioners. This is shown by the red
lines in in Figures 4 and 5, where D is kept at its baseline level of 27 but γ is raised to
1.05: in both types of countries, more powerful pensioners will put downward pressure in
capital taxation, at the expense of the workers. Hence, in our model, it is the political
economy rather than just the demography that explains while ageing countries tend to
cut capital taxation and shift the tax burden on to labor.18
Labor mobility
We now study the impact of labor mobility by varying φL by ±10%. The results are
reported in Figure 6 for a capital exporter and Figure 7 for a capital importer. In both
cases, more labor mobility puts downward pressure on labor taxation while shifting the
tax burden on to capital. Like for capital mobility, though, the reaction of tax rates is
much less in a capital importing country than in a capital exporting one. In the former
case, the private revenue loss related to an increase in capital taxation is more important
than in the latter case.
Again, population ageing leads the capital exporter to lower labor taxation and increase
capital taxation, while more political weight of the pensioners has the reverse impact.
18In our model, workers and pensioners have the same capital endowment. Alternatively, with higher
capital endowment for the pensioners, population ageing could change the status of the country from
capital importer to capital exporter, with a negative impact on the capital tax rate.
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Figure 6: Impact of labor mobility on taxation: net capital exporter (k¯ = 16)
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Notes: black lines are for D = 27, γ = 1; blue lines for higher dependence (D = 30, γ = 1), red lines for
higher political weight of pensioners (D = 27, γ = 1.05).
Figure 7: Impact of labor mobility on taxation: net capital importer (k¯ = 16)
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Notes: black lines are for D = 27, γ = 1; blue lines for higher dependence (D = 30, γ = 1), red lines for
higher political weight of pensioners (D = 27, γ = 1.05).
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In all the simulations presented here, we have considered a net labor exporting country
(L < L¯). For a net labor importing country, we also ﬁnd that increasing labor mobility
puts downward pressure on labor taxation, with a burden shifting on to capital.19 Hence
we do not ﬁnd the same asymmetry between labor exporters and labor importers as for
capital exporters and capital importers. The reason is that labor cannot move without its
capital endowment whereas capital can move without its labor endowment: when labor
becomes more mobile, it is extremely important for the country to keep its labor force
(through cutting the labor tax) whatever the net position in terms of labor, because capital
will move together with labor.
4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical methodology is close to Adam and Kammas (2007) who estimate the im-
pact of globalization on eﬀective tax rates on capital and on labor, for 17 OECD countries
over 1970-1997. They ﬁnd trade openness to have a negative impact on capital taxation
("eﬃciency eﬀect") but a positive impact on labor taxation ("compensation eﬀect"). How-
ever, they only study the impact of trade openness, not capital nor labor mobility, and
their sample stops before the steep increase in capital mobility.20 We nevertheless follow
their general methodology consisting in panel estimations with country and time ﬁxed
eﬀects, and a range of control variables that includes ageing, public spending, GDP and
the political orientation of the government. Contrasting with Adam and Kammas (2007),
though, we consider trade openness as a control rather than a variable of interest, and we
use speciﬁc measures of capital and labor mobility.
Our panel covers 28 OECD countries21 over the period 1997-2014. The empirical
speciﬁcation is the following:
KTAXit = a1KMOBit + a2LMOBit + a3Xit + FEi + FEt + uit, (19)
19We calibrate this case by assuming w∗ = 1 instead of 2.4. The economy is then close to balance in
terms of capital. The ﬁgures can be found in Appendix B.
20The time sample is especially important in our case. Indeed, Adam et al. (2013) show that studies
incorporating more recent years tend to ﬁnd more negative impact of globalization on capital taxation.
21Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
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LTAXit = b1LMOBit + b2KMOBit + b3Xit + FEi + FEt + vit, (20)
where KTAXit is the tax rate on capital for country i in year t, LTAXit the tax rate
on labor, KMOBit is the mobility of capital, LMOBit is the mobility of labor, Xit is a
vector of control variables, FEi, FEt are country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, and
uit, vit are the residuals. Based on the existing theoretical literature, we expect a1, b1 < 0
("race-to-the-bottom" eﬀect for capital and labor taxation, respectively) and a2, b2 > 0
(compensation eﬀect). However, we have shown theoretically that these eﬀects may be
inﬂuenced by the net international position of a country. In a second stage, we interact
capital mobility and labor mobility with proxies of factor endowments.
We now brieﬂy describe the data sources used in the analysis, with special attention
to tax rates and to the variables used to capture factor mobility.22
4.1 Tax rates
Consistent with theoretical models of tax competition that focus on source taxes, the
empirical literature on international tax competition has generally focused on the corporate
income tax and relied on the Eﬀective Average Tax Rate (EATR) which accounts for tax
allowances diﬀering across countries (see Devereux and Griﬃth, 1998). Adam et al. (2013)
note that studies based on implicit tax rates (e.g. corporate income tax revenues divided
by GDP or gross operating surplus) tend to ﬁnd a positive relationship with globalization,
but they are plagued with endogeneity problems.
We use EATRs from the 2016 update of the Oxford University Centre for Business Tax-
ation Tax Database developed by Bilicka and Devereux (2012). The EATR is calculated
as the ratio of post-tax to pre-tax net present value of a composite investment yielding a
20% pre-tax return ﬁnanced through a combination of debt, equity and auto-ﬁnancing.
As for the taxation of labor, we use the average tax wedge for a single individual with
no children, and earning a gross income representing 167% of average earnings. The tax
wedge includes both the income tax and social security contributions paid, and therefore
oﬀers a more complete picture of labour taxation than the statutory personal income tax
rate. We choose to work on the tax rate applied on relatively high wages because labor
22The list of variables and data sources is summarized in Appendix C.
22
mobility concerns mainly skilled labor across OECD countries. The data are taken from
the comparative tables of the OECD taxing wages database.
4.2 Measures of factor mobility
In their meta-analysis, Adam et al. (2013) highlight the importance of how globalization
is measured for the estimation of its impact on capital taxation. Some studies have used
trade openness or broader measures of globalization that also cover political and social
aspects (Dreher, 2006). Other studies have focused speciﬁcally on international capital
mobility. In the latter case, two categories of measures have been used: de jure (based on
existing restrictions to capital ﬂows as reported by the International Monetary Fund), or
de facto (based on actual cross-border capital ﬂows or stocks).
Figure 8 compares the evolution of de jure and de facto capital mobility for our sample
of 28 OECD countries, over 1997-2014. The de jure measure is the index constructed by
Chinn and Ito (2006), and regularly updated, based on the Annual IMF's Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. For de facto capital mobility,
we calculate the sum of gross external assets and gross external liabilities based on Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (updated) and divide by GDP in current dollar (World Bank
database). The graph shows that on average our countries reach high de jure mobility very
soon in our time sample, so the median and average of the de jure measure are almost ﬂat.
In contrast, the de facto measure shows a clear upward trend that only stabilizes after the
global ﬁnancial crisis. Since we intend to estimate the model in the within dimension, we
select the de facto measure (denoted by KMOB), which oﬀers the additional advantage
of being more consistent with our measure of labor mobility, which is also de facto (see
infra).23
For labor mobility, there is no available de jure measure. The Migrant Integration
Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by Huddleston et al. (2015) is a notable exception.
Unfortunately, the index covers only a few years between 2004 and 2014, and only a few
OECD countries. We rely on a de facto measure (LMOB), namely the sum of inﬂows
23We also used a Feldstein-Horioka measure of capital mobility, namely the absolute value of gross
domestic savings (GDP net of ﬁnal consumption expenditures) minus gross ﬁxed capital formation as
a percentage of GDP. We do not report the results with this proxy as they turned out to be always
non-signiﬁcant.
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Figure 8: De jure and de facto capital mobility: 28 OECD countries
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Chinn and Ito (2006) databases.
and outﬂows of non-nationals from and to other OECD countries, divided by the total
population of the country. Limiting our measure to intra-OECD gross ﬂows allows us
to focus on relatively more skilled labor mobility. The data are taken from the OECD
International Migration Database.
4.3 Control variables
Our ﬁrst control variable is trade openness denoted by TRADE, which is the sum of
exports and imports over twice the GDP, all variables being deﬁned in current US dollar
(CEPII and World Bank databases). The square of TRADE is also introduced in order
to capture a possible non-linear impact of trade openness, consistent with the economic
geography literature (Baldwin et al, 2003).
In advanced economies, ﬁnancial integration has been concommittant to population
ageing, which, as highlighted in our theoretical section, may aﬀect capital and labor tax-
ation is an ambiguous way. We control for the share of the population aged 65+ in total
population (65+) using data from OECD population statistics. We also control for polit-
ical cycles by adding a dummy variable RIGHT for a right-wing executive (World Bank
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Database of Political Institutions).24
In order to control for a possible "compensation eﬀect" of globalization, we control
for general government spending in percent of GDP, GOVSPEND (IMF World Economic
Outlook database).25 We also include the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio in order to capture a
debt brake eﬀect.
4.4 Factor endowments
Whether a country is a net capital importer or exporter can be observed through its net
position in terms of Foreign Direct Investment - FDI (the diﬀerence between FDI assets
and liabilities, hence a positive ﬁgure for a net capital exporter). The data is from the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database.26 Because net FDI may be endogenous to taxation, we
use the net stock in percent of GDP in the year before the beginning of the sample, hence
at end 1996. The variable is labelled FDI1996.
An alternative strategy, already followed by Hays (2003), consists in using the level of
capital per worker in a remote year as a proxy for the capital endowment. Consistently,
we use the stock of capital per worker in 1990, labelled k1990 (Penn World Tables).27 A
country with relatively high capital per worker in 1990 is likely to export capital in the
subsequent years.
For labor endowments, we follow a similar strategy. First, we retain the cumulated net
migrations (inﬂows minus outﬂows) over 1983-87 and divide by the domestic population in
1990 (based on UN data). The variable is labelled MIGR1990. It is positive for countries
lacking labor endowment (that need to import foreign labor). Alternatively, we use the
ratio of workers to total population in 1990, from the Penn World Tables, L1990. The
variable is higher the higher the labor endowment.
24Other political variables such as the share of seats in Parliament held by the government party did
not show up signiﬁcant.
25Adam et al. (2013) show that including a measure of government spending in the regression signiﬁ-
cantly reduces the coeﬃcient on globalization. Hence it is especially important to control for government
spending.
26Alternatively, we could use the net foreign asset position, but the latter includes sovereign assets and
liabilities that do not ﬁt our theoretical model which assumes budget balance.
27The data is not available for some of our countries before 1990.
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5 Econometric results
5.1 Preliminary estimates
As a preliminary exercise, we regress capital and labor tax rates separately on trade inte-
gration (TRADE, TRADE2), capital mobility (KMOB) and labor mobility (LMOB), while
controlling for government spending (GOVSPEND), lagged government debt (LDEBT),
the share of the population aged 65+ (65+) and the presence of a right-wing government
(RIGHT). Country and time ﬁxed eﬀects are also included. The results are reported in
Table 2. Columns (1) to (3) are for capital taxation, while (4) to (6) correspond to the
labor tax. Neither trade openness nor capital mobility seem to have any signiﬁcant impact
on both tax rates. Only labor mobility aﬀects the capital tax negatively in this speciﬁca-
tion. Conversely, there is evidence that ageing exerts negative impact on the capital tax
whereas the lagged public debt puts upward pressure on the labor tax.
Table 2: Preliminary results
KTAX LTAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE -0.351 -0.159
(0.223) (0.137)
TRADE2 0.299* 0.0739
(0.167) (0.105)
KMOB -0.00114 -0.00259
(0.00418) (0.00205)
LMOB -1.540** -1.126
(0.710) (1.003)
GOVSPEND 0.0765 0.102 0.0941 0.130* 0.174** 0.130
(0.0899) (0.0972) (0.0889) (0.0711) (0.0655) (0.0808)
LDEBT 0.0318* 0.0291 0.0276* 0.0819*** 0.0806*** 0.0741***
(0.0168) (0.0183) (0.0159) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0128)
65+ -1.086** -1.309** -1.373** 0.523** 0.302 0.394
(0.507) (0.611) (0.565) (0.243) (0.292) (0.277)
RIGHT -0.00800* -0.00598 -0.00686 -0.00280 -0.00210 -0.00243
(0.00466) (0.00503) (0.00493) (0.00337) (0.00386) (0.00348)
Observations 478 479 462 484 485 465
R-squared 0.515 0.495 0.514 0.411 0.405 0.420
N. of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5.2 Baseline results
We now introduce trade, capital mobility and labor mobility in a simultaneous way, and
examine the impact of being a net capital exporter or importer. The results are presented
in Table 3. Again, Columns (1) to (3) concern capital taxation, whereas Columns (4)
to (6) are for labor taxation. In each case, we start with a speciﬁcation that does not
account for capital endowments (Columns (1) and (4)). Strikingly, only two variables
appear signiﬁcant when no interaction term is introduced: ageing puts downward pressure
on the capital tax, while government spending increases the labor tax. Trade openness,
capital mobility and labor mobility do not have any signiﬁcant impact on both tax rates.
We then successively introduce our two measures of capital endowments: the net FDI
position in 1996 (FDI1996) and the capital per worker in 1990 (k1990). Both variables are
interacted with capital mobility. The interacted variable has a signiﬁcant, negative impact
on capital taxation, and positive impact on the labor tax: in a country with high capital
endowment (hence, in a net capital exporting country), more capital mobility triggers a
"race to the bottom" of the capital tax and a burden shifting to labor taxation. However,
this is less the case for a country with low capital endowment (the non-interacted mobility
has no signiﬁcant impact).
The ageing variable continues to aﬀect negatively the capital tax, whereas public spend-
ing and debt aﬀect positively the labor tax. Hence, an ageing society tends to shift to labor
the burden of additional public spending and debt. Labor mobility still has no signiﬁcant
impact on tax rates.
We now study how the impact of factor mobility on taxation reacts to labor endow-
ments. In Table 4, Columns (1) and (4) reproduce the results obtained in Table 3 with only
capital endowments (restricting their measure to FDI1996). In the other culumns, we in-
teract labor mobility with our two measures of labor endowment, successively: MIGR1990
and L1990. There is now evidence of a negative impact of labor mobility on labor taxa-
tion, except in a country with high labor endowment (high L1990). However this result is
not conﬁrmed by the use of the other measure of labor endowments (MIGR1990), which
appears insigniﬁcant. Additionally, labor mobility has no signiﬁcant impact on capital
taxation.
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Table 3: Impact of factor mobility on capital and labor taxation: capital endowments
KTAX LTAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE -0.351 -0.372 -0.271 -0.196 -0.173 -0.244*
(0.218) (0.219) (0.217) (0.124) (0.107) (0.119)
TRADE2 0.301* 0.285* 0.239 0.0963 0.107 0.133
(0.163) (0.150) (0.151) (0.0998) (0.0777) (0.0876)
KMOB -0.00153 0.0340 -0.000771 -0.00281 -0.0345*** -0.00325***
(0.00378) (0.0210) (0.00177) (0.00233) (0.00955) (0.00111)
KMOB*k1990 -1.25e-07* 1.12e-07***
(7.20e-08) (3.24e-08)
KMOB*FDI1996 -0.0522*** 0.0314***
(0.0153) (0.00921)
LMOB -1.190 -2.062* -0.630 -0.748 0.00403 -1.089
(0.843) (1.065) (0.693) (0.975) (0.828) (0.777)
GOVSPEND 0.0962 0.0970 0.0831 0.154** 0.152** 0.162**
(0.0976) (0.101) (0.0994) (0.0713) (0.0709) (0.0697)
LDEBT 0.0373* 0.0227 0.0275 0.0888*** 0.101*** 0.0947***
(0.0199) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0167)
65+ -1.294** -1.208** -1.160** 0.342 0.271 0.262
(0.566) (0.554) (0.558) (0.269) (0.256) (0.227)
RIGHT -0.00762 -0.00735 -0.00601 -0.000520 -0.000623 -0.00146
(0.00462) (0.00460) (0.00433) (0.00351) (0.00329) (0.00340)
Observations 461 461 461 464 464 464
R-squared 0.536 0.556 0.568 0.462 0.506 0.493
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4 also evidences a negative impact of trade openness on labor taxation (but not
on capital taxation), while the impact of the other control variables is similar as in Table
3.
Table 4: Impact of factor mobility on capital and labor taxation: labor endowments
KTAX LTAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE -0.271 -0.273 -0.273 -0.244* -0.244* -0.232**
(0.217) (0.216) (0.218) (0.119) (0.119) (0.111)
TRADE2 0.239 0.242 0.240 0.133 0.133 0.130
(0.151) (0.149) (0.152) (0.0876) (0.0878) (0.0844)
KMOB -0.000771 0.000115 -0.000898 -0.00325*** -0.00313** -0.00229**
(0.00177) (0.00195) (0.00167) (0.00111) (0.00130) (0.000998)
KMOB*FDI1996 -0.0522*** -0.0524*** -0.0513*** 0.0314*** 0.0314*** 0.0241***
(0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0179) (0.00921) (0.00922) (0.00851)
LMOB -0.630 0.199 -5.066 -1.089 -0.986 35.36***
(0.693) (1.033) (24.65) (0.777) (0.942) (7.476)
LMOB*MIGR1990 -262.1 -33.00
(195.1) (207.0)
LMOB*L1990 8.457 -69.47***
(46.26) (13.75)
GOVSPEND 0.0831 0.0691 0.0811 0.162** 0.160** 0.178***
(0.0994) (0.0977) (0.106) (0.0697) (0.0684) (0.0589)
LDEBT 0.0275 0.0244 0.0267 0.0947*** 0.0942*** 0.101***
(0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0188) (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0147)
65+ -1.160** -1.115** -1.166** 0.262 0.268 0.294
(0.558) (0.542) (0.553) (0.227) (0.220) (0.215)
RIGHT -0.00601 -0.00670 -0.00632 -0.00146 -0.00154 0.000964
(0.00433) (0.00443) (0.00426) (0.00340) (0.00326) (0.00329)
Observations 461 461 461 464 464 464
R-squared 0.568 0.572 0.568 0.493 0.493 0.550
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Based on the estimations presented in Table 3, Columns (3) and (6), we can calculate
the contribution of the increased capital mobility in the evolution of both tax rates between
2003 and 2014.28 The results are presented in Figures 9 and 10. In each case, the chart
reports the variation in the tax rate between 2003 and 2014, the contribution of capital
mobility and the contribution of the other signiﬁcant variables: ageing for capital taxation,
and government spending and debt for labor taxation. In both cases, the contribution of
rising capital mobility in explaining the evolution of tax rates between 2003 and 2014
is modest, with the exception of Hungary and Ireland as net capital importers, and the
Netherlands as a net capital exporter. In contrast, population ageing goes a long way
28Unfortunately, we are unable to start before 2003 because some tax rates are missing.
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in explaining the fall in the capital tax, while rising government spending and debt have
contributed positively to the increase in labor taxation.
Figure 9: Contribution of rising capital mobility to capital taxation, 2003-2014
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Source: Own calculations based on Table 3, Column (3) .
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Figure 10: Contribution of rising capital mobility to labor taxation, 2003-2014
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Source: Own calculations based on Table 3, Column (6) .
5.3 Robustness
In this section, we successively perform three robustness tests. First, we control for possible
endogeneity of factor mobility. Second, we check that our results are consistent with
diﬀerent tax convergence speeds between capital exporters and capital importers. Finally,
we perform a placebo test on the value-added tax and on the taxation of low-skilled
workers.
5.4 Endogeneity of factor mobility
Our measures of factor mobility are non-directional since they are sums of inward and
outward stocks or ﬂows. However, they are both de facto measures, hence one cannot
exclude some endogeneity bias. For instance, one could perhaps argue that low taxation
reduces cross-border frictions, hence encourages capital and labor mobility. To address
this problem, we can instrument capital and labor mobility by their ﬁrst lags.29 Clemens
and Hunt (2017) argue that lagging the migrant-to-population ratio leads to a "blunt
29Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to use remote lags.
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instrument" problem because the denominator of this ratio (total population) is almost
constant from one year to the next. This generates spurious correlation between labor
mobility and its lagged value. They rather recommend to use the lagged value of the
numerator (migrations) as an instrument. Hence we instrument labor mobility by lagged
migrations. For capital mobility, we use the ﬁrst lag of the variable itself, since both the
numerator and the denominator evolve smoothly over time. The interacted variables are
instrumented consistently.
The results are reported in Table 5, columns (1)-(3) for capital taxation and (4)-(6)
for labor taxation. Since the model is exactly identiﬁed, we cannot test for the exogeneity
of the instruments. The relevance of the instruments is tested through the Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistics (where the null is no correlation between the excuded instruments
and the endogenous variables) and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F one (where the null is
weak correlation). In the latter case, the critical values are not tabulated but the common
usage is to require that F > 10. Both tests suggests that our instrumentation strategy is
adequate in Table 5.
The various control variables bear similar signs and signiﬁcance as in our baseline
results, except for government debt (that now has positive impact on both tax rates) and
for trade openess that now has a signiﬁcant, non-linear impact on both taxes: negative for
small deviations at country level, but positive for large deviations. Concerning the impact
of capital mobility, the baseline results are conﬁrmed, although the interaction between
capital mobility and k1990 loses signiﬁcance to explain the evolution of capital taxation.
Finaly, labor mobility is not sgniﬁcant, like in our baseline estimations.
Labor mobility has a negative impact on labor taxation, although not in the last
speciﬁcation.
Table 6 replicates the same instrumentation strategy for the impact of labor endow-
ments. To facilitate comparisons, Columns (1) and (3) reproduce Columns (2) and (4) of
Table 5. We then interact labor mobility and labor endowments. Although the coeﬃcients
on the interacted variables are signiﬁcant, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistics is well
below 10, suggesting weak instruments. We conclude that there is no robust impact of
labor endowments on how taxation reacts to labor mobility.30
30This conclusion is reinforced by the fact thatMIGR1990 and L1990 should work in opposite direction:
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Table 5: Impact of instrumented factor mobility on capital and labor tax rates: capital
endowments
KTAX LTAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE -0.373*** -0.286** -0.407*** -0.235*** -0.274*** -0.170**
(0.120) (0.123) (0.115) (0.0910) (0.0827) (0.0685)
TRADE2 0.312*** 0.249*** 0.314*** 0.129* 0.158** 0.123**
(0.0857) (0.0869) (0.0859) (0.0668) (0.0613) (0.0518)
KMOB -0.00416 -0.00375 0.0230 -0.00419** -0.00439*** -0.0550***
(0.00267) (0.00236) (0.0196) (0.00167) (0.00151) (0.0126)
KMOB*FDI1996 -0.0713*** 0.0316**
(0.0132) (0.0124)
KMOB*k1990 -9.74e-08 1.83e-07***
(6.41e-08) (4.35e-08)
LMOB 2.857 5.520 3.816 4.350 3.183 2.541
(3.356) (3.958) (3.026) (2.822) (2.718) (2.179)
GOVSPEND 0.130** 0.111* 0.131** 0.136** 0.144** 0.133***
(0.0522) (0.0645) (0.0589) (0.0635) (0.0565) (0.0488)
LDEBT 0.0623*** 0.0543*** 0.0568*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.114***
(0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0218) (0.0149) (0.0132) (0.0137)
65+ -1.308*** -1.133*** -1.250*** 0.299* 0.220 0.193
(0.251) (0.259) (0.257) (0.164) (0.152) (0.149)
RIGHT -0.00597* -0.00344 -0.00529 0.00171 0.000595 0.000510
(0.00352) (0.00392) (0.00347) (0.00249) (0.00247) (0.00199)
Observations 436 436 436 439 439 439
R-squared 0.493 0.475 0.479 0.231 0.323 0.429
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 21.419*** 17.717*** 29.489*** 21.560*** 17.780*** 29.059***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 28.068 15.529 19.054 27.835 15.335 18.643
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Impact of instrumented factor mobility on capital and labor tax rates: labor
endowments
KTAX LTAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE -0.286** -0.346** -0.226* -0.274*** -0.306*** -0.172**
(0.123) (0.151) (0.118) (0.0827) (0.102) (0.0780)
TRADE2 0.249*** 0.298*** 0.209** 0.158** 0.182** 0.0955*
(0.0869) (0.104) (0.0860) (0.0613) (0.0743) (0.0550)
KMOB -0.00375 -0.00262 -0.00148 -0.00439*** -0.00352** -0.000514
(0.00236) (0.00277) (0.00211) (0.00151) (0.00168) (0.00156)
KMOB*FDI1996 -0.0713*** -0.0798*** -0.0665*** 0.0316** 0.0264** 0.0408***
(0.0132) (0.0140) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0121)
LMOB 5.520 12.96*** 26.35** 3.183 7.639*** 42.88***
(3.958) (3.739) (12.95) (2.718) (2.792) (7.503)
LMOB*MIGR1990 -813.2*** -494.2***
(174.0) (124.0)
LMOB*L1990 -49.37* -93.56***
(27.46) (15.51)
GOVSPEND 0.111* 0.0631 0.133*** 0.144** 0.114 0.189***
(0.0645) (0.107) (0.0473) (0.0565) (0.0834) (0.0567)
LDEBT 0.0543*** 0.0610*** 0.0414** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.0863***
(0.0199) (0.0236) (0.0168) (0.0132) (0.0158) (0.0117)
65+ -1.133*** -0.980*** -1.088*** 0.220 0.322* 0.275*
(0.259) (0.290) (0.249) (0.152) (0.184) (0.163)
RIGHT -0.00344 -0.00356 -0.00406 0.000595 0.000616 -0.000724
(0.00392) (0.00424) (0.00349) (0.00247) (0.00275) (0.00208)
Observations 436 436 436 439 439 439
R-squared 0.475 0.252 0.543 0.323 0.039 0.339
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 17.716*** 26.871*** 12.091*** 17.780*** 27.628*** 12.751***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 15.529 8.802 8.025 15.335 8.643 8.253
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5.5 Convergence speed
In our theoretical model, imperfect capital or labor mobility translate into wedges between
domestic after-tax returns and their world levels. The wedge declines following an increase
in factor mobility. Hence, after-tax return should converge over time to the world level
when capital and/or labor mobility increases. Consistently, countries starting with higher
tax rates on capital at the beginning of the sample period should see their rate decline
more, especially when they are net capital exporters.
In order to test for this convergence hypothesis, we estimate the following dynamic
model:
∆TAXit = βTAXit−1 + FEt + uit, (21)
where TAX stands for either the capital or the labor tax, ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator
and FEt are time ﬁxed eﬀects. We expect β < 0, meaning that higher tax rates tend to
decline faster over time. Equation (21) can be estimated in the following form:
TAXit = (1 + β)TAXit−1 + FEt + uit (22)
Equation (22) is estimated through a parcimonious diﬀerence GMM methodology
where the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the explanatory variable is instrumented by the second lag
of its level.31 Table 7 reports the results for the whole sample, for net capital importers
(with negative FDI position in 1996) and for net capital exporters (with positive FDI po-
sition in 1996). Columns (1) to (3) concern capital taxation whereas Columns (4) to (6)
are for labor taxation. The second-order auto-correlation test suggests that the set of 16
instruments is suﬃcient, while the Sargan test conﬁrms the validity of the instruments for
the whole sample (although it is les the case for net capital exporters due to the reduced
number of countries).
For the whole sample and both tax rates, the autororrelation coeﬃcient is less than
unity but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. It is also the case for net capital importers.
a high MIGR1990 denotes low labor endowment whereas a high L1990 denotes a high labor endowment.
Additonally, instrumenting labor mobility by its lagged value (instead of the lagged numerator of the
ratio) provides insigniﬁcant results, and the instrument is found even weaker.
31See Roodman (2009).
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For net capital exporters, however, the auto-regressive coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly less than
one: the (downward) convergence only comes from capital exporting countries, consistent
with our theoretical results. These results are nevertheless fragile given the limited num-
ber of groups compared to the number of instruments. In Appendix D, we re-estimate
Equation (22) through a panel with country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. All autoregressive
coeﬃcients are found signiﬁcantly less than one. In the case of the capital tax, the auto-
regressive coeﬃcient is signiﬁcanly lower for capital exporting countries than for capital
importing ones.
Table 7: Simple auto-regressive model: diﬀerence GMM estimation
VARIABLES KTAX LTAX
All Kimport Kexport All Kimport Kexport
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.KTAX 0.883*** 1.028*** 0.620***
(0.0931) (0.0971) (0.162)
χ2 test coeﬀ=1 1.58 0.09 5.48**
L.LTAX 0.989*** 1.077*** 0.820***
(0.0954) (0.135) (0.0417)
χ2 test coeﬀ=1 0.01 0.33 18.54***
Observations 432 240 192 436 244 192
No. of countries 28 16 12 28 16 12
Number of instr. 16 16 16 16 16 16
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.099 0.002 0.009 0.036
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.347 0.689 0.099 0.352 0.441 0.608
Sargan test (p-value) 0.100 0.216 0.028 0.545 0.824 0.013
All columns include time ﬁxed eﬀects. Std errors in parentheses.
Instruments used for ﬁrst-diﬀerentiated equation: second lag of tax level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Arellano-Bond (AR) test: H0: No auto-correlation of the residuals.
Sargan test: H0: Instruments are exogenous.
5.6 Placebo
Our last exercise is to test for the impact of capital and labor mobility on standard value-
added tax (VAT) rates (or general sales tax) and on the tax wedge at low levels of income
(minimum wage) - hence on two tax bases that are generally considered immobile. The
results are presented in Table 8. Columns (1) to (3) present the results for the VAT while
Columns (4) to (6) are for the taxation of low-skilled labor.
For the VAT, our model performs poorly, since only a right-wing government has
weakly signiﬁcant, positive impact on the VAT rate. For the taxation of low-skilled labor,
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we ﬁnd a positive impact of government debt and of labor mobility, consistent with what
is expected for a relatively immobile tax base. Capital mobility seems to aﬀect negatively
the tax rate on low-skilled labor, but with limited signiﬁcance and robustness.
In Appendix D, we show the same estimations while instrumenting capital and labor
mobility as in Section 5.4. The results are mostly unchanged, except that government
debt now exerts positive pressure on both tax rates while the impact of labor mobility is
shifted to the VAT. Government spending also contributes to an increase in the tax rate
on low-skilled labor.
On the whole, this "placebo" exercise suggests that the race-to-the-bottom with budren
shifting found in the previous sections for net capital exporting countries is speciﬁc to the
taxation of capital and high-skilled labor.
Table 8: Impact of factor mobility on VAT and on the taxation of lower wages
VARIABLES VAT LTAX low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADE 0.0982 0.100 0.0869 -0.168 -0.174 -0.136
(0.0812) (0.0802) (0.0839) (0.127) (0.124) (0.133)
TRADE2 -0.0830 -0.0767 -0.0748 0.0932 0.0904 0.0683
(0.0509) (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0880) (0.0881) (0.0915)
KMOB 0.000803 -0.00980 0.000695 -0.00347** 0.00516 -0.00317**
(0.00101) (0.00585) (0.000979) (0.00149) (0.0114) (0.00131)
KMOB*k1990 3.73e-08* -3.05e-08
(1.91e-08) (3.99e-08)
KMOB*FDI1996 0.00655 -0.0213**
(0.00451) (0.00856)
LMOB 0.272 0.552 0.205 1.719*** 1.514** 1.950***
(0.251) (0.329) (0.216) (0.481) (0.629) (0.516)
GOVSPEND 0.00399 -0.000196 0.00507 0.107 0.108 0.102
(0.0273) (0.0298) (0.0277) (0.0708) (0.0709) (0.0700)
LDEBT 0.0184 0.0238 0.0200 0.0928*** 0.0895*** 0.0889***
(0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0172)
65+ 0.0580 0.0215 0.0385 0.0180 0.0373 0.0720
(0.185) (0.190) (0.191) (0.264) (0.252) (0.256)
RIGHT 0.00387* 0.00375* 0.00364* -0.00198 -0.00195 -0.00134
(0.00209) (0.00212) (0.00209) (0.00429) (0.00425) (0.00428)
Observations 441 441 441 464 464 464
R-squared 0.316 0.335 0.321 0.402 0.405 0.416
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6 Conclusion
By relaxing the assumptions of perfect capital mobility and perfect labor immobility, we
have shown theoretically that ﬁnancial globalization does not necessarily lead to a race-to-
the-bottom of capital tax rates, whereas labor mobility does matter for both capital and
labor taxation. More speciﬁcally, both our simpliﬁed model and the simulations of our
complete model show that only net capital exporting country wil feel a sharp downward
pressure on its (source) capital tax rate and a pressure to shift the burden on to labor
when capital mobility increases. Net capital exporters are also more sensitive to changes
in labor mobility.
Our theoretical results are supported by the econometric estimations run on a panel of
28 OECD countries over 1997-2014. We ﬁnd evidence that capital mobility has a negative
impact on capital taxation and a positive impact on labor taxation, but essentially for net
capital exporting countries. Conversely, we ﬁnd that rising labor mobility has ambiguous
eﬀects on tax rates.
We conclude that the mixed results obtained in the literature concerning the link
between international capital mobility and capital taxation may be related to improperly
controlling for other factors, notably trade openness and ageing, failing to account for
labor mobility, and especially to the extreme assumption of full capital mobility versus
full labor immobility. Quantitatively, population ageing is found to have much more
impact on capital tax rates than ﬁnancial globalization over the period studied.
This paper may be extended in various ways. In particular, the game between countries
could be studied through reaction functions. Additionally, the development of immaterial
capital has oﬀered new possibilities of tax optimization, with increased pressure on tax
rates; and new technologies may oﬀer new opportunities for households to live and work in
diﬀerent places. Finally, diﬀerent scenarios of (partial) tax cooperation could be studied.
These developments are left for future research.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Anne Epaulard, Nelly Exbrayat, Guy Gilbert, Friedrich Heinemann,
Eckhard Janeba, Sébastien Jean, Etienne Lehmann, Lise Patureau, Hillel Rapoport, Ariell
38
Reshef, Alain Trannoy, Bruno Ventelou, Vincent Vicard, and to the participants in various
seminars and workshops, for their useful remarks on a preliminary draft. The usual
disclaimer applies.
39
References
Adam, A., and P. Kammas, 2007. Tax policies in a globalized world: Is it politics after
all? Public Choice 133, 321341.
Adam, A., Kammas, P., and A. Lagou, 2013. The eﬀect of globalization on capital taxation:
What have we learned after 20 years of empirical studies? Journal of Macroeconomics
35, 199209.
Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G., and F. Robert-Nicoud, 2003. Economic
Geography and Public Policy. Princeton University Press.
Baldwin, R., 2016. The Great Convergence, Information Technology and the New Glob-
alization. Harvard University Press, November.
Borjas, G.T., 1989. Economic theory and international migration. The International Mi-
gration Review 23(3), 457-485.
Braid, R.M., 1996. Tax competition with multiple jurisdictions in each metropolitan area.
The American Economic Review 86(5), 1279-1290.
Bucovetsky, S., 2003. Tax eﬃcient migration and income tax competition. Journal of
Public Economic Theory 5(2), 249-278.
Bucovetsky, S., and J.D. Wilson, 1991. Tax competition with two tax instruments. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 21(3), 333350.
Bilicka, K., and M.P. Devereux, 2012. CBT corporate tax ranking 2012. Saïd Business
School, June.
Chinn, M.D., and H. Ito, 2006. What matters for ﬁnancial development? Capital controls,
institutions, and interactions. Journal of Development Economics 81(1), 163-192.
Cimadomo, J., 2016. Real-time data and ﬁscal policy analysis: A survey of the literature.
Journal of Economic Surveys 30(2), 302-326.
Clemens, M.A., and J. Hunt, 2017. The labor market efects of refugees waves: Reconciling
conﬂicting results, NBER working paper 23433.
Devereux, M.P., and R. Griﬃth, 1998. Taxes and the location of production: Evidence
from a panel of US multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 68, 35-367.
40
Dreher, A., 2006. The inﬂuence of globalization on taxes and social policy: An empirical
analysis for OECD countries. European Journal of Political Economy 22, 179201.
Egger, P., Nigai, S. and N. Strecker, 2016. The taxing deeds of globalization, Mimeo.
Fernandez, A., Klein, M.W., Rebucci, A., Schindler, M., and M. Uribe, 2015. Capital
control measures: A new dataset, IMF working paper WP/15/80.
French, K., and J. Poterba, 1991. Investor diversiﬁcation and international equity markets.
American Economic Review 81(2), 22226.
Hays, J.C., 2003. Globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democ-
racies. World Politics 56(1), 79-113.
Horioka, C.Y., and N. Ford, 2017. The solution to the Feldstein-Horioka puzle. ISER
discussion paper 1016, November.
Huddleston, T., Bilgili, O., Joki, A.L., and Z. Vankova, 2015. Migrant integration policy
index. Barcelona Center for International Aﬀairs, June.
Itskhoki, O., and D. Mukhin, 2019. Exchange rate disconnect in general equilibrium.
Mimeo, August.
Jordà, O., Knoll, A., Kuvshinov, D., Schularick, M., and A.M. Taylor, 2019. The rate of
return of everything: 1870-2015. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12251298.
Kleven, H.J., Landais, C., and E. Saez, 2013. Taxation and international migration of
superstars: Evidence from the European football market. American Economic Review
103, 18921924.
Kleven, H.J., Landais, C., Saez, E., and E.A. Schultz, 2014. Migration and wage eﬀects
of taxing top earners: Evidence from the foreigners' tax scheme in Denmark. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 129, 333378.
Lane, P., and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti, 2007. The external wealth of nations mark II: Re-
vised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 19702004. Journal of
International Economics 73, 223-255.
Lee, K., 1997. Tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital. Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics 42, 222-242.
Lehmann, E., Simula, L., and A. Trannoy, 2014. Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear
41
income tax between competing governments. Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4),
1995-2030.
Liebig, T., Puhani, P.A., and A. Sousa-Poza, 2007. Taxation and Internal Migration -
Evidence from the Swiss census using community-level variation in income tax rates.
Journal of Regional Science 47, 807836.
Lewis, K., 1999. Trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption. Journal of
Economic Literature 37(2), 571608.
Lindé, J., and A. Pescatori, 2012. The macroeconomic eﬀects of trade tariﬀs: Revisiting
the Lerner symmetry result. IMF WP/17/151.
Mendoza, E., and L. Tesar, 2005. Why hasn't tax competition triggered a race to the
bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU. Journal of Monetary Economics 52,
164-204.
Masson, P.R., Kremers, J., and J. Horne, 1994. Net foreign assets and international ad-
justment: The United States, Japan and Germany. Journal of International Money and
Finance 13, 27-40.
Peralta, S., and T. van Ypersele, 1991. Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asym-
metric tax competition game. Journal of Urban Economics, 57, 258274.
Piketty, T., and E. Saez, 2012. Optimal labor income taxation. NBER WP No. 18521.
Razin, A., and E. Sadka, 1991. International tax competition and gains from tax harmo-
nization. Economics Letters, 37 (1), 6976.
Razin, A., and E. Sadka, 2012. Tax competition and migration: the race-to-the-bottom
hypothesis revisited. CESIfo Economic Studies, 58(1), 164180.
Richter, W., and D. Wellisch, 1996. The provision of local public goods and factors in the
presence of ﬁrm and household mobility? Journal of Public Economics 60, 73-93.
Rodrik, D., 1998. Do more open economies have bigger governments? The Journal of
Political Economy 106, 9971032.
Roodman, D., 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 71(1), 135158.
Slemrod, J., 2004. Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging? Journal of Public
42
Economics 88, 1169-1186.
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock, 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments
Econometrica 65(3), 557-586.
Wilson, J.D., 1995. Mobile labor, multiple tax instruments, and tax competition. Journal
of Urban Economics 38, 333-356.
Wilson, J.D., 1999. Theories of tax competition. National tax journal 52(2), 269-304.
Zodrow, G., and P. Mieszkowski, 1986. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the under-
provision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics 19, 356370.
43
Appendix A: Derivation of the theoretical model
The Government's problem rewrites as the following optimization problem in (k, L) :
max
k,L
U
(
L
L+D
yL +
γD
L+D
yD,
G
L+D
)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L
L+DyL +
γD
L+DyD =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L+γD
L+D
[
k(k−k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯
]
+ LL+D
[
w∗ +
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
]
+ γDL+Dp if k¯ ≥ k,
L+γD
L+D
[
k¯(k−k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯
]
+ LL+D
[
w∗ +
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
]
+ γDL+Dp if k¯ ≤ k,
G
L+D = F
(
k, h LL+D
)
−
(
r∗ + (k−k¯)φK
)
k −
(
w∗ +
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
)
L
L+D − p DL+D .
(A.1)
The weighted average personal income is obtained from (8) and (9). The average spending
is obtained by replacing the tax rates τK and τL in (11) by F
′
K − r and F ′L − w and by
using (4), (6). The equation is then rearranged using the homogeneity property of the
production function. Moreover, the tax rates satisfy:
τK = F
′
K
(
k, h LL+D
)
− r∗ − (k−k¯)φK ,
τL = F
′
L
(
k, h LL+D
)
− w∗ −
(
1− L¯
L
)
φL
.
(A.2)
First order conditions are:
U ′Y (., .)
[
(2k−k¯)
φK
L+γD
L+D
]
+ U ′G (., .)
[
F ′K (., .)− r∗ − (
2k−k¯)
φK
]
= 0 if k¯ ≥ k,
U ′Y (., .)
[
k¯
φK
L+γD
L+D
]
+ U ′G (., .)
[
F ′K (., .)− r∗ − (
2k−k¯)
φK
]
= 0 if k¯ ≤ k,
(A.3)
and:
U ′Y (., .)
[
(1− γ)D
(
k¯
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯ + p
)
+D
(
w∗ +
1
φL
− p
)
+
L¯
φL
]
+U ′G (., .)
[
F ′L (., .)D −D
(
w∗ +
1
φL
− p
)
− L¯
φL
]
= 0. (A.4)
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One can rewrite (A.3) as follows:
F ′K (., .)− r∗ − (
k−k¯)
φK
= 1φk
[
k − U ′Y (.,.)
U ′G(.,.)
L+γD
L+D
(
2k − k¯)] if k¯ ≥ k,
F ′K (., .)− r∗ − (
k−k¯)
φK
= 1φk
[
k − U ′Y (.,.)
U ′G(.,.)
L+γD
L+D k¯
]
if k ≥ k¯,
(A.5)
Using the expression of τK in (A.2), we obtain (12).
One can rewrite (A.4) as follows:
U ′Y (., .)
U ′G (., .)
=
[
D
(
w∗ + 1φL − p
)
+ L¯φL − F ′L (., .)D
]
[
D
(
w∗ + 1φL − p
)
+ L¯φL − (1− γ)D
(
k¯(k−k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯ + p
)] (A.6)
which implies:
U ′Y (., .)
U ′G (., .)
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γ=1,D>0
= 1− F
′
L (., .)D[
D
(
w∗ + 1φL − p
)
+ L¯φL
] < 1 and U ′Y (., .)
U ′G (., .)
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D=0
= 1. (A.7)
Note also that when D = 0, (A.5) reduces to:
F ′K (k, h)− r∗ = 0 if k¯ ≥ k,
F ′K (k, h)− r∗ −
2(k−k¯)
φK
= 0 if k¯ ≤ k,
(A.8)
and (A.4) to:
U ′Y (., .)− U ′G (., .) = 0. (A.9)
If the Social Welfare function is additively separable and using (A.2), (A.9) can be written
as:
U ′Y
(
k
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯ + F ′L (k, h)− τL
)
−U ′G
(
F (k, h)−
(
r∗ +
(
k − k¯)
φK
)
k − F ′L (k, h) + τL
)
= 0,
(A.10)
if k¯ ≥ k. Using the homogeneity property of the production function and (A.8), the latter
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can be rewritten as:
U ′Y
(
k
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯ + F ′L (k, h)− τL
)
− U ′G
(
−k
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ τL
)
= 0, (A.11)
which used as an implicit function gives (16). Similarly, (A.9) can be written as:
U ′Y
(
k¯
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ r∗k¯ + F ′L (k, h)− τL
)
− U ′G
(
k
(
k − k¯)
φK
+ τL
)
= 0, (A.12)
if k¯ ≤ k. We obtain
∂τL
∂φK
=
− k¯(k−k¯)
φ2K
U ′′Y Y +
k(k−k¯)
φ2K
U ′′GG
U ′′Y Y + U
′′
GG
+
U ′′Y Y
[
k¯
φK
+ F ′′KL (k, h)
]
− U ′′GG 2k−k¯φK
U ′′Y Y + U
′′
GG
dk
dφK
, (A.13)
where:
dk
dφK
=
2k
φ2K
F ′′KL (k, h) +
2k
φK
> 0. (A.14)
The sign of is therefore ambiguous.
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Appendix B: Impact of labor mobility on taxation: The case
of a net labor importer
Figure 11: Impact of labor mobility on taxation: net labor importer (w∗ = 1)
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Notes: black lines are for D = 27, γ = 1; blue lines for higher dependence (D = 30, γ = 1), red lines for
higher political weight of pensioners (D = 27, γ = 1.05.
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Appendix C
Table 9: Variables deﬁnitions and data sources
Variable Label Deﬁnition Source
Capital tax rate KTAX Eﬀective average tax rate on corporate income Oxford University
Labor tax rate LTAX Tax wedge on gross income representing 167% of gross earnings (single, no children) OECD
Labor tax rate low LTAX low Tax wedge on gross income at the minimum wage OECD
Capital mobility KMOB Gross external assets + liabilities /2GDP Lane Milesi-Ferretti
Labor mobility LMOB Inﬂows+outﬂows of non-nationals from and to other OECD countries /total population OECD
Trade openness TRADE Exports + Imports /2*GDP CEPII, World Bank
Trade openness squared TRADE2 Square of TRADE CEPII, World Bank
Ageing 65+ Share of the population aged 65+ OECD
Right-wing executive RIGHT Dummy = 1 if right-wing executive World Bank
Government spending GOVSPEND Gerneral government spending /GDP IMF
Net FDI position FDI1996 (FDI assets - FDI liabilities)/GDP Lane Milesi-Ferretti
Capital endowment k1990 Capital per worker in 1990 in USD mn of 2011 Penn World Tables
Net migration MIGR1990 Cumulated net immigration 1983-97/residents United Nations
Labor endowment L1990 Employment to population in 1990 Penn World Tables
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Appendix D: Additional regressions
Table 10: Simple panel auto-regressive model
VARIABLES KTAX LTAX
All Kimport Kexport All Kimport Kexport
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.KTAX 0.805*** 0.859*** 0.758***
(0.0342) (0.0313) (0.0575)
F test coeﬀ=1 32.37*** 20.40*** 17.69***
L.LTAX 0.808*** 0.818*** 0.803***
(0.0321) (0.0418) (0.0435)
F test coeﬀ=1 35.57*** 18.87*** 20.59***
Observations 460 256 204 464 260 204
R-squared 0.841 0.860 0.844 0.731 0.754 0.717
No of countries 28 16 12 28 16 12
Country and time FE. Std errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Impact of factor mobility on VAT and on the taxation of low wages: instru-
mented mobility
VARIABLES VAT LTAX low
TRADE 0.0661 0.0671 0.0782** -0.154** -0.111 -0.163**
(0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0382) (0.0742) (0.0732) (0.0724)
TRADE2 -0.0555* -0.0562* -0.0567* 0.0901* 0.0592 0.0909*
(0.0308) (0.0300) (0.0294) (0.0536) (0.0514) (0.0535)
KMOB -8.63e-05 -8.13e-05 -0.00969 -0.00379*** -0.00358*** 0.00335
(0.000791) (0.000789) (0.00680) (0.00138) (0.00135) (0.0102)
KMOB*FDI1996 -0.000846 -0.0342***
(0.00534) (0.00986)
KMOB*k1990 3.46e-08 -2.57e-08
(2.29e-08) (3.42e-08)
LMOB 2.232* 2.269* 1.814* 1.482 2.746 1.736
(1.147) (1.223) (0.963) (2.111) (2.240) (1.916)
GOVSPEND -0.00446 -0.00472 -0.00586 0.103** 0.0936** 0.103**
(0.0253) (0.0258) (0.0215) (0.0415) (0.0443) (0.0418)
LDEBT 0.0274*** 0.0273*** 0.0295*** 0.0902*** 0.0862*** 0.0888***
(0.00782) (0.00775) (0.00822) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0130)
65+ 0.0124 0.0148 -0.0158 -0.0294 0.0562 -0.0146
(0.0920) (0.0920) (0.0936) (0.155) (0.159) (0.155)
RIGHT 0.00460*** 0.00463*** 0.00425*** -0.00144 -0.000238 -0.00128
(0.00130) (0.00135) (0.00121) (0.00212) (0.00214) (0.00205)
Observations 419 419 419 439 439 439
R-squared 0.317 0.324 0.341 0.379 0.400 0.382
N of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 18.098*** 14.600*** 26.415*** 21.560*** 17.780*** 29.059***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 23.490 12.560 15.803 27.835 15.335 18.643
All columns include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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